False data injection attacks can pose serious threats to the operation and control of power grid. The smarter the power grid gets, the more vulnerable it becomes to cyber attacks. Various detection methods of cyber attacks have been proposed in the literature in recent past. However, to completely alleviate the possibility of cyber threats, the compromised meters must be identified and secured. In this paper, we are presenting an Artificial Intelligence (AI) based identification method to correctly single out the malicious meters. The proposed AI based method successfully identifies the compromised meters by anticipating the correct measurements in the event of the cyber attack. NYISO load data is mapped with the IEEE 14 bus system to validate the proposed method. The efficiency of the proposed method is compared for Artificial Neural Network (ANN) and Extreme Learning Machine (ELM) based AI techniques. It is observed that both the techniques identify the corrupted meters with high accuracy.
Set of buses directly connected to the bus i.
N bus Set of all the buses in the network. 
Introduction
Utilization of electrical energy is recognized as the most efficient way of energy consumption. The electrical power system, a complex web of generating stations, transmission lines, and distribution systems, ensures that this electrical energy is supplied to the end users efficiently and reliably. The real time monitoring of the events in the power system is very crucial for its secure operation. Energy management system (EMS) uses state estimation (SE) to estimate the complex voltage (V ∠θ) at each bus in the power system [1] . SE uses field sensors data which are collected from Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) to accurately estimate the real time voltages of the network. Once the system states are estimated, the system operator performs the security analysis to ensure the reliable and secure operation of power system. The futuristic 'smart grid ' offers improved reliability of electrical power and robust operation and control of the power grid. Information and communication infrastructure enables power systems to be available from outside networks which allow remote control; faster location and isolation of faults; and quick restoration of electrical power [2] .
Accessibility of information to the end users facilitates Demand Response (DR) and
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI). Smart metering at the consumer end provides two-way communication between the utility and the customer [3] , which enables the end users to access real-time pricing and usage. In the advent of information and communication technology (ICT), apart from physical security of power system, cyber security has also gained great importance. Securing the cyber aspect means securing all the communication between physical power system components like remote terminal units (RTUs) and intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) as well as communication between SCADA and field sensors. Any weak link in the cyber security of power system can threaten the physical security of the power system due to interconnected cyber-physical infrastructure.
Despite multifold advantages, ICT integration in the power system has also unlocked the possibilities of cyber intrusions.
The data obtained from the field sensors and meters also contains meter noise as well as errors due to fault in the meters. The accuracy of estimated states depends on the quality of measurement sensors. Bad data detection is incorporated in SE to identify the faulty meters which are the source of the errors. To achieve the accurate state estimates, the redundancy in the measurements is important to identify and detect the source of bad data [4] . The researchers have shown that false data injection (FDI) attack can be launched by injecting the small errors in the meters within the toleration of bad data detection algorithm [5] . However, if the attacker succeeds in gaining network information (network topology, line parameters and access to meters), can launch a far more serious form of FDI attacks [6] . In [7] , it is presented that the adversary can still launch a successful (formulation of attack vector which bypasses the bad data detection is considered here as 'successful' or 'well-crafted' attack. Here-onwards, 'successful' and 'well-crafted' will be used interchangeably throughout the paper.) FDI attack against SE with limited network knowledge and restricted access to the meters in the network. Load redistribution attacks can be formulated by intelligently modifying the load meters data for accessible meters in such a way that the total load on the system remains unchanged [8] . Load redistribution attack can also cause incorrect security constrained economic dispatch (SCED), resulting in an uneconomic power system operation, load shedding and in the worst case system wide disruptions [9, 10] . In addition to the false data injected in the meters, attack on the topology can also be launched by deceiving the system operator with falsified network topology. To carry out such attack, meter reading and on/off states of the network switches are manipulated simultaneously and intelligently to project false system operating point [11] .
FDI attacks have many adverse effects on the operation of power system. The cyber threats are not only limited to the security of the power system. A well-constructed attack on the electricity markets can also be launched for gaining financial benefits. In [12] , an optimised attack to gain economic benefits in the real time market is presented.
Xie et al. presented an attack to affect the deregulated energy market [13] . It is shown that the attacker can make profits by buying virtual power at the lower price in the day ahead market and selling it at the higher price in real time market.
To secure the power grid from the aforementioned attack strategies, various methods to alleviate the possibilities of the attack are presented by the researchers in recent years. Defensive approaches against false data injection attacks can be broadly classified into two categories; protecting meters (PMUs, IEDs, and RTUs); and real time attack detection. In the former approach, protecting the set of critical measurements in the network is presented in [14] . It is rather idealistic to ensure the security of the critical meter all the time. Moreover, in the case of attack considering limited network knowledge, attacker confines the attack in relatively smaller and remote region. Tampering the meter security and launching a successful attack is still possible [12] . However, it is worth noting that placing sufficient PMUs in the network can aid in detecting FDI attacks. The cost of deploying PMUs is high, therefore, an optimized number of PMUs and their strategic locations are presented in [15] for detecting cyber attacks. Real time detection based approach for FDI attacks are presented in [16, 17, 18] . In [16] , CUSUM detector based approach is presented. Collaborative intrusion detection system against the false data injection attacks is given in [17] . Attack vectors can be separated out from the measurements using sparse optimization as shown in [18] .
Chaojun et al. [19] , presented real time detection of false data injection attacks based is used to compare the historical and real time measurement variations. In [20] , a joint transformation based approach to detect FDI attacks is presented. The technique has higher detection probability but the method fails to identify the attacked meters. In this paper, we went beyond the detection and propose an AI based identification of the attacked meters by accurate estimation the loads and measurements in the event of FDI attack. To detect the attack, the same approach as proposed in [19, 20] is used. After successful detection, AI based load estimator accurately identifies the attacked meters so that a corrective action can be taken by the system operator to maintain the integrity of the SE. The proposed approach efficiently identifies the FDI attacks in smart grid with minimum perturbed meters, therefore, it is assured that the scheme can correctly identify the attacks with larger perturbation irrespective of the kind/motive of the attack. Hence, the scheme ensures secure and economic operation and control of the power system.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. In section 2 a brief overview of state estimation (SE) and false data injection attacks is presented. Section 3 describes the ANN/ELM based identification methodology, section 4 presents results and discussion for IEEE 14 bus test system and section 5 conclude the paper with possible future outlooks.
Brief summary of State Estimation (SE) and False
Data Injection (FDI) attacks
Power system state estimation
To estimate the power system states, the SE uses the field measurements data collected by SCADA from the field sensors. The redundant measurements are often used to ensure that the bad measurements (containing meter errors or due to telemetry errors) can be easily filtered out. The field measurements includes, voltage measurement for PV (generator) bus, real and reactive nodal power injections and real and reactive power flows in the transmission lines. For a N bus power system, considering polar co-ordinates, the number of states defining the power system completely are 2N bus −1. The state vector x contains N bus voltage magnitude and N bus − 1 phase angles. θ 1 is given an arbitrary value 0 for a reference. Therefore, x can be denoted as;
For z measurement set available with m measurements, Weighted Least Square (WLS)
estimates the state by minimizing J(x), which is given as;
The measurement function h(x) is formulated by defining the real and reactive power flow and power injection measurements as given in (3)- (6) .
False data injection attacks
Since Liu et al. [6] identified the vulnerability in power grid against false data injection attacks, the power engineering community has witnessed extensive research in the area of cyber-physical power systems. As explained in [6] , the adversary with the knowledge of certain power system and network related information can launch FDI attacks in order to deceive the system operator with incorrect estimated states. The motives behind such attacks can be multiple, ranging from making financial misconducts to jeopardizing entire operation and control of power system.
Cyber-threats can be broken down into the core components of the information security triad; Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA). False data injection attacks can be considered as the combination of loss of integrity and confidentiality. An attacker with access to the critical network and system information (loss of confidentiality) can inject a false data into the smart meters (loss of integrity) to mislead the system operator with false system states.
The general FDI attack can be launched by finding a suitable attack vector as long as the normalized residue is less than the threshold for bad data detection as shown below,
here a i is the injected error in the measurement z i . This problem can be solved for the set of meters accessible by the adversary (a i = 0). The feasibility of launching the attack with the specified set of accessible meters are not guaranteed, however, a possible combination of meters can be found out to form a suitable attack vector with small errors which are tolerated by state estimation algorithm.
FDI attacks bypasses the bad data detection of the state estimation as shown in [6] , if z − Hx ≤ τ , an attack vector a, which is the linear combination of column vector of H (i.e. a = Hc), can bypass the bad data detection test as shown below,
Based on the above lemma (8), many different attack strategies are proposed in the recent years. By keeping (8) satisfied, attacks can also be launched with limited information [7, 21] . This brings in the idea of separating out the attacking and non-attacking region from the network based on the information of the network and accessible meters possessed by the attacker. The attack is launched by forming the attack vector in such a way that the states of the boundary buses remain unchanged and the attack is confined only in the attacking region, thereby, satisfying (8) for launching a successful attack.
AI based Identification of malicious meters
It can be concluded from the previous section, that all FDI attacks, irrespective of their modeling, eventually misleads the system operator with falsified system states. Furthermore, as the targeted state variable increases, a higher number of meters are required by the adversary to launch the 'successful' attack. Therefore, it is logical to design a protection scheme which is capable of detecting the attack with a minimum set of compromised meters. As given in [19, 20] , historical measurement variations can be used to detect the FDI attacks in the real-time. The Kullback Leibler Divergence gives the difference 
Conventional SE
Measurement data from the field sensors (RTUs, PMUs, and IEDs) is collected by the SCADA system. System operator runs the WLS (Weighted Least Square) state estimator to estimate the current operating states of the power system. Bad data detection, a part of SE process detects and identifies the source of bad data in the measurements by obtaining the normalized residues as explained in section 2.2. The output of the SE process (WLS state estimator and bad data detection) is the estimatedx. System operator visualizes the entire power grid using the estimatedx to run critical programs like contingency analysis, optimal power flow, and security analysis to ensure secure operation of the grid.
To ensure the integrity of estimated statex, the false data detection is implemented after state estimation as shown in Fig. 1 .
False data detection
For the k th measurement sample, the measurement variation can be obtained from the estimated statex k and previous statex k−1 as given in (9) .
here z k = h(x k ) + e k and z k−1 = h(x k−1 ) + e k−1 . Assuming meter errors at both time
Similarly the measurement variation of the historical data is obtained from the historical database. It is assumed that the measurements in the historical database are true measurements and does not have any FDIs.
In [19] , KLD is calculated directly by comparing the historical measurement variations with k th measurement variation. The Kullback-Leibler distance is a measure of the information lost when p(s) is used to approximate q(s). The Kullback-Leibler distance (KLD) between two probability mass functions p(s) and q(s) is represented as,
The Kullback-Leibler Divergence can be calculated from (10), here p(s) and q(s) are probability distribution of measurement variation data set 's' for the current measurement sample k and for the historical measurements respectively. The KLD calculated for the sample k is known as 'run time KLD'. The measurement variation q(s) is constructed from the six months old historical measurement variation data set. In order to confirm the presence of false data injection, the run time KLD (KLD k ) is compared with the predefined threshold value (KLD thres ). It is worth noting here that setting a threshold value is very critical for detecting false data injection attacks. Setting lower threshold results in higher false positive rate, whereas, a higher value of threshold results in poor detection efficiency. 
Identification of attacked meters
For mapping complex nonlinear input-output relations, feed forward neural networks are extensively used in various domains and applications. Single hidden Layer Feed forward
Neural networks (SLFN) also known as Extreme Learning Machine (ELM) has faster learning time as compared to the conventional feed forward neural networks [22] . As applied in this work, ANN and ELM are used to predict the load from older load sample.
The load estimator has 17 inputs (11 loads for 11 zones for (k − 1) th sample, which will be explained in Section 4.1; 3 inputs for the weather details (weather input includes temperature, dew point and humidity) of the (k − 1) th sample; and 3 inputs for weather details of k th sample) and 11 outputs (11 predicted loads for k th sample). As shown in Fig. 3 , NYISO has eleven load zones which are mapped with eleven loads in IEEE 14 bus system as given in [19] . The steps, for forming the test data are enumerated as follows,
1. Due to the unavailability of the reactive load data, information about the power factor at each bus is used from standard IEEE 14 bus data. Reactive power demand for each bus at 5 minutes interval is calculated by keeping same power factor for the load buses as given in standard data. A fully measured power system is considered, therefore we have, real and reactive power injection measurements for all the load buses, real power injection for all the generator buses and to and fro real power flow measurements for all the transmission lines. Therefore, a total of 57 measurements is considered at each 5 minutes time interval.
Attack Formulation
The attack can be crafted by using any formulation methodology presented in section 2.2.
However, as explained earlier, irrespective of the motive of launching the FDI attack, the ultimate effect to the power system is falsified system states. Depending on the formulation of the attack, the affected state variable may be single or multiple. Due to the complex web of transmission lines, the number of meters required to launch the perfect attack increases significantly with the increase in the targeted state variables.
Furthermore, as the number of targeted state variables increases, the cost of launching a perfect attack (number of meters required to be accessed) also increases, therefore, an adversary tries to limit the meters by limiting the target states and tries to maximize the impact with a minimum set of meters. The defense strategy, therefore, must be robust enough to detect FDI launched with minimum affected meters. In a fully measured power system, attack on single state variable requires the minimum set of meters (depending on the connectivity of the network, attack on one state variable requires power injection meters associated with the buses which are directly connected to the target state variable bus and flow meters on connecting transmission lines). Hence a generalized attack is formulated affecting only one state variable at a time.
For IEEE 14 bus, 27 state variables corresponds to 27 attacks scenarios taking one state at a time. An attack on state variable θ i or V i will require N i inj and N i f low injection and power flow meters which are define as follows,
here, N i A is the set of buses which are affected by the change in the state variable θ i or
To launch a generalised attack, adversary modifies all the measurements for real and , 0, . . . , 0
Post-attack measurements can be calculated by using state vector, x bad =x + c and solving (3)- (6) . For successfully launching the attack, it is assumed that the attacker has knowledge of the network adjoining the bus corresponding to the target state vector. The post-attack measurements are given by,
False Data Detection
To detect the FDI attack in real time, run time KLD (KLD k ) is compared with the threshold (KLD thres ). To calculate the threshold, measurement variations for the complete month of July are compared with past six months historical measurement variations (1st Jan to 30 June). The KLD for each measurement sample in July is calculated and plotted as a histogram shown in Fig. 4(a) .
The threshold KLD thres is the value of KLD which is higher than 99% of the values in the histogram shown in Fig. 4(a 
Identification of attacked meters
To identify the meters in which the false data is injected, we use ANN/ENN based load estimator to predict the load for the k th sample based on the loading condition of the immediately preceding sample (k − 1) and the weather condition of k th and (k − 1) th sample. To ensure efficient identification of attacked meters, a threshold of error between the measurements obtained from predicted/estimated loads (load estimator) and actual measurements is calculated considering the true samples from the month of July. The mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) for different measurements obtained from predicted load is shown in the Table 1 and Table 2 for ANN and Table 3 and Table   4 for ELM. The threshold ǫ, which is the absolute percentage error greater than 99% of the samples in the month of July is tabulated for power injection meters and flow meters given in the Table 1 and Table 2 respectively for ANN and in Table 3 and Table 4 respectively for ELM. Load estimation using ANN is more accurate as compared to ELM, however, the time taken to train an untrained network is 2.88 minutes for ANN and 36.61 seconds for ELM. Every transmission line is assumed to have two real power meters at each end.
The threshold and MAPE for both the meters were approximately same, hence threshold and MAPE for only one meter in the line is shown.
Once the attack is detected by the false data detection, the load is predicted for the measurement sample for which the attack is detected. The estimated measurements with the corresponding threshold ǫ. Table 5 and Table 6 shows the identified meters for the attack on all θ i with different injected errors c(%) for ANN and ELM respectively.
As shown in the table, the proposed method identifies all the meters quite efficiently and accurately. Furthermore, the proposed method accurately discriminate true samples from the attacked one in the case of falsely detected by the false data detection process.
Last row of the Table 5 and Table 6 shows that how the true measurement sample is accurately differentiated. Similarly for the attacks involving V i state variables, meters identified for all the samples for the month of August is shown in Table 7 and Table 8 for ANN and ELM respectively. Complementing the results obtained for θ i , the results for V i also shows the same accuracy in identifying the attacked sensors for all the samples in consideration.
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In real time application, predicting load measurements and identification of attacked meters from a trained network takes 0.192 seconds for one sample measurement set.
Once the attacked meters are identified, the system operator can remove attacked meters from the state estimation provided that the system still remains observable. As we have considered the fully measured power system, removing all the identified meters will make the system unobservable. However, in the practical scenario, system operator have pseudo measurements to maintain observability of system. Otherwise, taking measures to ensure the security of the identified meters or replacing the identified meters can be a possible solution to mitigate similar future FDI attacks. 5 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 4 5 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 16 17 18 
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By only increasing the security of the meters we can increase the attack cost but cannot assure that system will always remain hack-proof. To ensure the authenticity of the measurements received by SCADA from the field sensors, it is important for the system operator to cross-check the information using the algorithms which are precisely optimised to detect a malicious data injection by the adversary. In this paper we proposed an artificial intelligence based algorithm to identify the compromised sensors in the event of cyber-intrusion. The method can detect and identify the attacks if the cumulative injected error in the state variable is greater than ±1%. However, if the attacker injects the errors within the limits of the expected load patterns, such attack may not be detected. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that injecting errors within the limits of the expected load patterns may will not cause significant change in the system states. However, one may argue, attack vector injected cumulatively over the period of time (if the meters are continuously attacked) can have a significant impact, but feasibility of such attack depends on the condition that loads, transformer taps, network topology, scheduled outages and generator schedules remains as per the prediction of the adversary for the entire duration of the attack, but such assumption is rather idealistic. Furthermore, in the event of a coordinated attack which causes instant power system stability issues, the proposed method is not applicable. Our research on detecting and alleviating attacks causing power system instability is ongoing.
